The Importance of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms: The Case of the Inspector General by Apaza, Carmen R.
The Importance of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms: The Case of the Inspector General 
The Importance of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms: 
The Case of the Inspector General  
 
Carmen R. Apaza, 
The American University 
 
Introduction 
Inspectors General (IG) have been playing an extraordinary role in exposing fraud, waste 
and abuse as well as promoting efficiency in federal agencies. This year will be the 30th 
anniversary of the 1978 Inspector General Act (P. L. 95-452.) So, this is the perfect time to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Inspectors General through a systematic evaluation of 
their interventions.  
Recently, the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and Executive 
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) announced that in Fiscal Year 2007, Offices of 
Inspector General identified significant potential dollar savings from a number of audits, 
investigations, evaluations, and inspections.1 Cumulatively, these efforts resulted in: $11.4 
billion in potential savings from audit recommendations, $5.1 billion from investigative 
recoveries and receivables, 6,800 indictments and criminal information, over 8,900 successful 
prosecutions; about 4,300 suspensions or debarments, and nearly 310,000 hotline complaints 
processed.2 It is interesting to know that the outcomes from a number of Offices of Inspector 
General (OIG), such as those from the Department of Defense (DOD)3, Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS)4, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)5 show an increasing 
amount of total recoveries, fines and restitutions.  
Furthermore, some OIGs like the DHS OIG have had a high percentage of their 
recommendations accepted by their host agencies’ heads. These great achievements enhance the 
importance of the OIG in improving federal agencies’ ethical management. This paper analyzes 
the context of these important results by focusing on the OIG of the DHS. This OIG has been 
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1 President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Media release 
issued on April 8th, 2008. “Offices of Inspector General Identify Billions in Potential Savings.” 
The PCIE and the ECIE were created in 1981 and 1982 respectively. They coordinate and enhance governmental 
efforts to promote integrity and efficiency and to detect and prevent fraud, waste and abuse in Federal programs 
(http://www.ignet.gov/pande/mission1.html) 
2 PCIE and ECIE: A Progress Report to the President, Fiscal Year 2007, available at: 
http://www.ignet.gov/randp/fy07apr.pdf 
3 DOD OIG Semiannual Report to Congress. October 1, 2007-March 31, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/sar/SAR_062308.pdf  
4 HHS OIG Semiannual Report to Congress, October 1, 2007-March 31, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/semiannual/2008/semiannual_spring2008.pdf 
5 DHS OIG Semiannual Report to Congress, October 1, 2007-March 31, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_SAR_Oct07_Mar08.pdf 
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highlighted not only because it has been continuously increasing the amount of recoveries but 
also, as mentioned before, because it has been achieving high percentages (over 90%) of 
recommendations accepted by its host agency. Thus, first this paper analyzes theories about 
bureaucratic oversight mechanisms such as the office of inspector general. Second, it describes 
the Inspector General Act. Third, it addresses what OIGs do. Fourth, it evaluates the context in 
which OIGs work. Fifth, it analyzes main findings from data analysis corresponding to DHS 
OIG’s activities from Fiscal Years 2003 to 2007. Finally, it draws some conclusions. 
 
Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms 
The purpose of oversight mechanisms is to ensure that public officials conduct 
themselves ethically in the most effective and efficient manner.6 These control mechanisms may 
be internal or external. The former refer more to accounting evaluation (i.e. checking the 
accuracy and reliability of accounting data)7 and are usually conducted by an audit unit of the 
target agency. The latter refer more to investigations of activities and have been formally 
operated by legislatively created offices such as auditors, inspectors, independent counsels, and 
ombudsmen.8 But, both corruption and fraud have been seriously challenging these control 
mechanisms. Indeed, they remain critical problems for public administration.9 They undermine 
citizens’ confidence and can even destroy the legitimacy of the political system. Hence, 
oversight mechanisms are needed to uncover, and investigate those unethical behaviors.  
A number of scholars support the creation and strengthening of oversight mechanisms 
whether internal or external.10 They point out that public officials’ behavior should be 
                                                 
6 Zimmerman, Joseph. Curbing Unethical Behavior in Government. (Wesport, CT:Greenwood Press, 1994). 
7 Evans, John, et al in Mckinney, Jerome B. and Michael Johnston, editors. Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Government. 
Causes, Consequences and Cures. (Philadelphia: Ishi Publications, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1986). 
8 Testimony of Project on Government Oversight (POGO)'s Nick Schwellenbach, before the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee "Examining the Executive Branch Reform Act of 2007 and the Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act of 2007", February 13, 2007. Available at:  http://www.pogo.org/p/government/gt-
070201-reform.html 
9 Anechiarico, Frank. The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
10 Bhargava, Vinay, & Emil Bolongaita. Challenging Corruption in Asia. Case Studies and  Framework for Action. 
(Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2004). 
Caiden, Gerald E., Dwivedi, O.P., and Jabbra, Joseph. Where Corruption Lives. (Bloomfield, Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, Inc., 2001). 
Fantaye, Dawit. “Fighting Corruption and Embezzlement in Third World Countries.” The Journal of criminal law, 
Vol 68, April, 2004. pp. 170-176. 
Johnston, Michael. Syndromes of Corruption. Wealth, Power, and Democracy. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
Klitgaard,, Robert. Controlling Corruption. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).. 
Mckinney, Jerome B. and Michael Johnston, editors. Op. Cit. 
Nelson, William E.. The Roots of American Bureaucracy, 1830-1900. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1982). 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. “Corruption and the Private Sector” in Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Michael Johnston, and 
Victor T. LeVine. Political corruption. (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1989).  
Thompson, Dennis. Political Ethics and Public Office. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1987, 
p..7). 
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scrutinized11 and monitored.12 Moreover, White13 and Wilson14 argue that efficient public 
administration could not be ensured without fighting corruption, and so they support the idea of 
having corruption controls to assure integrity.15 This is a constant challenge for all 
governments.16  
 On the other hand, several scholars fear that control mechanisms may create more 
bureaucratic problems17 or resistance to accomplishing goals18 or a system that causes a decrease 
in citizens’ confidence in public agencies19, or a system that may violate fundamental precepts of 
democratic administration (e.g., discretion)20, or a system that may create “bureaucratic 
pathology” and red tape21. Thus, some scholars suggest that public management should be 
flexible22 and final decisions should not take long or require multiple approvals. They argue that 
too many controls make government inefficient and may not reduce corruption and fraud. Others 
have gone even further arguing that corruption is sometimes efficient.  
However, there is a lack of systematic and empirical evidence showing that oversight 
mechanisms are not working or are causing inefficiency.23While corruption and fraud are 
challenging and threaten never to disappear, it is true that oversight mechanisms diminish their 
effects. The challenge is to make these mechanisms accountable24 and effective. They need to be 
                                                 
11 Thompson, Dennis. Ibidem 
12 Bhargava, Vinay, & Emil Bolongaita. Ibidem 
13 White, Leonard D. Introduction to the Study of Public Administration. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1950). 
14 Wilson, Woodrow .“The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2 (June, 1887: 197.  
15 White, Leonard D. Op. Cit. 1950 
Wilson, Woodrow. Op. Cit. 1887 
In fact, Wilson’s idea, when proposing separating politics from administration, was to pursue of having an ideal 
bureaucracy. 
16 Nelson, Op. Cit, 1982, p.120. 
17 Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967). 
18 Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. (New York: BasicBooks, 
1989). 
19Breyer, Stephen. Breaking the Vicious Circle toward Effective Risk Regulation. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1993) p.50. 
20 Kelman, Steven.  Procurement and Public Management: The fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government 
Performance.(Washington DC: The AEI Press., 1990) p.1 
Ostrom, Vincent. The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration. (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University 
of Alabama Press, 1989). 
Gruber, Judith E.. Controlling Bureaucracies, Dilemmas in Democratic Governance. (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1988). 
Kaufman, Herbert. Red tape, its Origins, Uses, and Abuses. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977).    p. 
25 
21 Anechiarico, Frank. “Purging Corruption from Public Contracting: The “Solutions” are now Part of the Problem”. 
New York Law School Review. 40, p143, 1995-1996. 
Fesler, James W. and Donald F. Kettl. The politics of the administrative process. (New Jersey: Chatham House 
Publishers, Inc. 1991). 
22 Osborne and Gaebler. Reinventing Government, How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming The  Public 
Sector. (New York, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1992) 
23 It is not difficult to find corruption and fraud cases. What is challenging is to show how bureaucratic control 
mechanisms are combating and preventing those problems. 
24 Moore, Mark H. Creating Public Value, Strategic Management In Government. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p.183 
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evaluated in a systematic way. 25 Although nobody knows how much corruption or fraud exists, 
we do know that the problem will not go away of its own accord.26 Hence, existing oversight 
mechanisms such as Inspectors General need to be evaluated to see how their interventions are 
helping with the search for integrity in public agencies.  
Before addressing in detail the Inspector General it would be useful to discuss briefly 
what corruption and fraud imply. In fact, overall Inspectors General’s interventions look at a 
variety of unethical behavior that may be classified as corruption or fraud. However, rather than 
presenting an exhaustive analysis on theories, this section briefly describes the types of 
misconduct classified as corruption or fraud. 
The phenomenon of corruption has been a subject of study from a number of international 
organizations such the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank (WB). 
They have defined corruption in similar ways. For instance, the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption (1996) of the OAS defines corruption as “any act or omission in the discharge 
of his duties by a government official or a person who performs public functions for the purpose 
of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party”. The Convention on Combating 
Bribery (1997) of the OECD defines “active corruption” or “active bribery” as the offense 
committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe; and “passive bribery” or “passive 
corruption”, as the offense committed by the official who receives the bribe. The Manual on 
Anti-Corruption Policy (2001) of the UN defines corruption as “an abuse of public power for 
private gain that hampers the public interest. It entails the confusion of the private with public 
sphere or an illicit exchange between the two spheres”. The World Bank defines corruption as 
the “misuse of a public position for private benefit”.  
In addition, Transparency International defines corruption as the “behavior on the part of 
officials from the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they unlawfully 
and improperly enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power 
entrusted to them”. As we can see the definitions significantly overlap. So, according to these 
international organizations, corruption may be defined as the misuse or abuse of the public 
power for private gain. Notice that they have not defined corruption as a crime, mainly because 
this is something that each country should do for itself.  
The U.S. Code, Title 18, section 201 includes bribery of public officials as a crime. 
Between 1990 and 2002, federal prosecutors convicted more than 10,000 government officials of 
acts of official corruption, such as conflict of interest, fraud, campaign-finance violations, and 
obstruction of justice27 By using a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. from the 
Justice Department’s Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity 
Section, Glaeser and Saks found that more educated states and, to a smaller degree, richer states 
                                                 
25 Rose-Ackerman, Susan in Heidenheimer, Arnold. Op.Cit, 1989, p. 816 
Jonas Prager (1994) argues that contracting out is inappropriate when the total costs of outsourcing –contractor 
charges plus contract administration- are greater than the costs of continued internal production.  
26 Mckinney, and Johnston, editors, Op. Cit, pp.v 
27 Glaeser, Edward L., Raven E. Saks. “Corruption in America”. Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 90, pp. 1053-
1072, 2006. 
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have less corruption. Interestingly enough, their results also show a strong correlation of the level 
of corruption with the level of income and less correlation with the size of government. 
The common typology of corruption as explained above includes such behavior as 
“bribery”. The bribed public official typically agrees to undertake or to forego a designated 
action in return for a bribe.28 Other corrupt activities include influence peddling, insider deals 
and kickbacks,29 fraud,30 nepotism and misappropriation of public resources committed by 
elective or appointive officials.31   
Fraud is one of the many faces of bureaucratic corruption. It involves dishonesty, 
venality, awarding of jobs and contracts to unqualified persons, awarding decisions and services 
in exchange for bribes and kickbacks.32 Fraud also involves illegality and the obtainment of 
either money or benefits from governmental programs.33 Fraud includes such practices as theft, 
embezzlement, false statements, illegal commissions, deceit by suppression of the truth, 
kickbacks, conspiracies, obtaining contracts through collusive arrangements, and intentional 
mischarging or misallocation of contract costs.34 So, fraud is a form of corruption. In extreme 
cases, it can damage not only the effective management of public programs and resources, but 
also the citizen’s basic trust in and support of government.35  
So, more efforts should be made to control all kinds of corruption including fraud. Some 
cures have been suggested. For instance, to prevent fraud and kickbacks, very tightly drawn 
contracts and careful, close oversight are needed.36 When the government is not a smart buyer it 
                                                 
28 Noonan, John T. Jr. Bribes. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984). 
Reisman, Michael. Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms. (New York: The Free Press, a Division of 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979) p.69 
Rose-Ackerman. Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. (New York: Academic Press, 1978). 
29 Menzel, Donald C. Ethics Management for Public Administrators. Building Organizations of Integrity. New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p.148 
30 Frederickson, H. George (1999). “Ethics and the New Managerialism”. Public Administration & Management: An 
Interactive Journal.. Vol. 4, issue 2, 1999, pp. 299-324 
31 Nye, J.S., “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. American Political Science Review, 
1967, 61: 2. 
Caiden (2001) observes that Nye’s definition includes almost all operational activities of corruption.  
32 Caiden in Mckinney and Johnston (1986), Op. Cit., p.32 
33 Mckinney, Jerome B. “Concepts and Definitions” in Mckinney, Jerome B. and Michael Johnston, editors. Fraud, 
Waste and Abuse in Government. Causes, Consequences and Cures. Philadelphia: Ishi Publications, Institute for the 
Study of Human Issues. 1986) p.5 
34 Mckinney, Jerome B. Ibid, 1986, pp.5 
35 Johnston, Michael. “Corruption and Democracy in America” in Mckinney, and Johnston, editors. Fraud, Waste 
and Abuse in Government. Causes, Consequences and Cures. Op. Cit..1986. 
36 Apaza, Carmen. “Public Management Challenge: Ensuring Accountability and Controlling Corruption”. Public 
Purpose, vol. 3, 4 issue, May 2007, School of Public Affairs, American University, Washington DC. 
Banfield, Edward C. “Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organizations”. Journal of Law and Economics. 18 
(3): 1975, pp. 587-605 
Graeff, Peter. “Why Should One Trust in Corruption?” The Linkage Between Corruption, Norms, and  Social 
Capital.” pp.40-58 in Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube, and Matthias Schramm, The New Institutional 
Economics of Corruption, Routledge, New York, 2005. 
Frederickson, H. George. “Ethics and the New Managerialism”. Public Administration & Management: An 
Interactive Journal.. Vol. 4, issue 2, 1999, pp. 299-324. 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan in Heidenheimer, Arnold. Op.Cit, 1989  
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will be open to corruption.37 These control activities certainly should be done by experienced 
contracting specialists. In the accomplishment of their functions, they need to apply complex 
laws and regulations effectively. These activities will require great expertise from bureaucrats. 
This should not be a problem because those “virtues” are the “chief merit” of the bureaucracy.38 
However, the absence of these virtues along with weak control mechanisms would create 
opportunities for corruption including fraud. Thus, strong oversight mechanisms such as 
Inspectors General are needed to combat and prevent those unethical behaviors.  
 
The Inspector General  
Historically, in the United States the search for integrity and accountability in 
government has led to the passing of a number of ethics laws. It also led to changing perspectives 
on monitoring bureaucracies. These anticorruption mechanisms were usually a political response 
to the disclosure of serious corruption scandals. For example, after the Watergate scandal (1972-
3), which may be depicted as a corruption derived from the ideas and practices of American 
democracy, 39 the U.S. government passed the Inspector General Act (1978) and the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978. These acts established the Office of Inspector General (OIG)40 and the 
Office of Government Ethics (OGE.)  
By creating the OIGs, Congress wanted a consolidated oversight office within the major 
federal agencies that would know what was going on but would not be accountable solely to the 
head of any agency audited.41 The Inspectors General are independent of either executive or 
legislative political influence. They are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, 
report directly to the head of their host department or agency and keep Congress and their agency 
head fully informed of any problems and deficiencies found in service delivery.  
Over the past thirty years, Congress has established 64 statutory IGs who oversee federal 
government.42 They are members of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) 
                                                 
37 Frederickson, H. George. “Ethics and the New Managerialism”. Public Administration & Management: An 
Interactive Journal.. Vol. 4, issue 2, 1999, pp. 299-324. 
Prager,  Jonas.”Contracting out Government Services: Lessons from the Private Sector. Public Administration 
Review. Vol. 54, No. 2. (Mar. – Apr., 1994), pp.176-184 
According to Government Accountability Office (GAO, July 17, 2007) agencies continue to experience poor 
acquisition outcomes in buying goods and services in part because of challenges in setting contract requirements and 
ensuring sufficient oversight. 
38 Max Weber in Gerths and Mills, translators. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946). 
Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. (Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1957) 
39 Eisenstadt, Abraham S. “Political Corruption in American History” in Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Michael 
Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, Political corruption. (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1989) p.535 
Emery, Fred. Watergate. The corruption of American Politics and the Fall of Richard Nixon. (New York: Times 
Books, 1994). 
40 and the Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988. 
41 Hendricks et al,  Op. Cit, 1990, p.11 
Zimmerman, Op.Cit , 1994, p153 
42 Claude M. Kcklighter, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Defense, Foreword, The Journal of Public 
Inquiry, Fall/Winter 2007-2008, a publication of the Inspectors General of the United States, 
http://www.ignet.gov/randp/fw07jpi.pdf 
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(when presidential appointment of the Inspector General is required) and the Executive Council 
on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) (when Inspectors General are appointed by their agency 
heads). Inspector General (IG) offices play a significantly important role in advancing good 
government practices, but one important point to accomplish their goals is their independence. It 
allows them to do their job43 
The issue of Inspectors General’s independency was broadly discussed during the 
Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate on 
September 9, 1998, (celebrating twenty years of the Inspector General Act.)44 At that time the 
case of two IGs were discussed: the case of Susan Gaffney from Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) and June Gibbs Brown from Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS). The HHS Inspector General highlighted that she had a successful working 
relationship with HHS Secretary Donna Shalala. For instance, HHS IG always had a seat at the 
HHS policy discussion table and Secretary Shalala had always supported HHS IG’s work. HHS 
Secretary saw HHS IG as a resource rather than an adversary. In contrast, the HUD IG argued 
that HUD Secretary had exhibited a hostile attitude toward the independence of the HUD OIG. 
Nevertheless, even though this work environment was hard, HUD IG could still accomplish her 
mission. These are two different contexts in which IGs work.45 
 
What OIGs Do 
The mission of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), as spelled out in the original 
statute, is to: conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating 
to agency programs and operations; promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the 
agency; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in agency programs and operations; review 
and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating 
to agency programs and operations; and keep the agency head and the Congress fully and 
currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations. In other words, the Inspector 
General community works to ensure that the interests of the U.S. citizens are represented when 
important governmental decisions are made.46 To do so, OIGs are required to have independent 
and objective units to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal operations; 
and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and mismanagement.47  
To accomplish their objectives, OIGs perform three principal activities: audits, 
investigations, and inspections. An investigation focuses on a single provider of a service to 
                                                 
43 Testimony of POGO's (July 11, 2007) Danielle Brian before the Senate - House Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee on “Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation’s Inspectors General. Available 
at: ”http://www.pogo.org/p/government/gt-070711-ig.html 
44 “The Inspector General Act: 20 Years Later.”, Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the 
United States Senate, September 9, 1998  
45 Senator Glenn’s statement before the Committee on Govnernemental Affairs, Unted States Senate, in“The 
Inspector General Act: 20 Years Later.” 
46 Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Energy and Vice Chair of the President’s 
Council on Integrity and Efficiency: “Sunshine is the Best Antiseptic”, The Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall/Winter 
2007-2008, a publication of the Inspectors General of the United States, http://www.ignet.gov/randp/fw07jpi.pdf 
47 Hendricks et al.Op. Cit, 1990, p. 11 
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determine if there is criminal or civil wrongdoing. An audit focuses on an agency or group of 
providers to determine if federal money has been spent appropriately. An inspection evaluates 
the broader management of an entity or examines the policies, operations, regulations, or 
legislative implications of a given issue.48  
Before the 90s, OIGs mainly conducted the financial audits and criminal investigations 
with which people associated IGs investigation and audit activities49 Traditionally Inspectors 
General conduct more investigations in agencies that have significant numbers of contract.50 
Audits also have the greatest potential to further the goals of preventing fraud and improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public administration.51 However, according to Hendricks et al,52 
inspections are more effective in preventing fraud than audits and investigations. In this regard, 
Moran53 argues that the inspections function is a distinct and separate function from audits and 
investigations. The inspection function is basically an evaluation activity. Some inspections 
examine the extent to which individual federal programs or installations are complying with 
applicable laws, regulations and policies, while other inspections determine how entire programs 
might be amended or redirected.  
At the beginning of the 90s, the reinventing government movement broadened Inspectors 
General’s activities to include performance monitoring operations (i.e. performance audit.) In 
1993 the first National Performance Review volume of recommendations asked the OIGs to 
broaden the focus of the Inspector General from strict compliance auditing to evaluating 
management control systems.54 These new mandates affected Inspectors General’s internal 
operations. In other words, OIG’s audit units grew bigger than the inspections and investigations 
units. For instance, a survey conducted showed that the audit function was the largest sub-unit 
within the presidential appointed IG offices. Regarding investigations, for agencies with a great 
number of contractors, there were more investigations (e.g. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, and Transportation).55  
Overall, OIGs mission is delicate as they are to look at transgressions committed by 
officials inside their host agencies (not to mention that inspectors general have to report these 
transgressions to both the head of the host agency and the Congress). When focusing on fellow 
agency officials and their transgressions, Inspectors General have often been cautious.56 The 
picture is complex on bribery and kickbacks cases where outsiders and insiders are at fault. The 
case becomes even more complicated when the conflict of interest is within the OIG.  
 
                                                 
48 Hendricks et al Ibid, 1990, p.13 
49 Hendricks, et al, Ibid, 1990. 
50 Newcomer, Kathryn E. “Opportunities and Incentives for Improving Program Quality: Auditing and Evaluating”. 
Public Administration Review. Vol. 54, No. 2. (Mar. – Apr., 1994), pp. 147-154. 
51 Anechiarico, Op. Cit. 1996 
52 Hendricks et al.Op. Cit, 1990 
53 Moran in Hendricks et al. Op. Cit., 1990 
54 Gore, Al. From Red Tape to Results. Creating a Government that Works Better & Cost Less, Report of the 
National Performance Review. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p.32 
55 Newcomer, Kathryn E. Op. Cit., 1994, pp. 147-154. 
56 Gormley, William. Taming the Bureaucracy: Muscles, Prayers, and other Strategies. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1989) p. 124 
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The context in which OIGs work 
 When analyzing the context in which OIGs work many factors should be considered 
including: size and importance of the host agency, resources (i.e., staff and budget), training 
(e.g., procurement and ethical standards), the contracting out and procurement activities, 
whistleblowing and hotline complaints. This paper analyzes these issues within the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS.) 
Size of Host Agency 
DHS is one the largest agencies in contract spending. Its contract spending has increased 
from  $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2003 to $15.7 billion for FY 2006) That total makes DHS the 
third largest agency, after DOD ($296 billion) and DOE ($22 billion). However, DHS’s number 
of alleged fraud cases has also been increasing. For instance, the Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task 
Force has referred 11,000 potential fraud cases to Homeland Security. Separately, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified another 22,000 fraud cases related to 
Homeland Security. 57   
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
was established by the Homeland Security Act 2002 (P.L. 107-296). According to this law, the 
Inspector General is responsible for conducting and supervising audits, investigations, and 
inspections relating to DHS’ programs and operations. As a result of its evaluations OIG can 
criticize DHS’s operations and activities, recommending ways for DHS to carry out its 
responsibilities in the most economical, efficient, and effective manner possible. Another 
important function refers to the oversight of the management and expenditures of all contracts, 
grants, and governmental operations related to the on-going hurricane relief efforts. 
This oversight is to be accomplished through internal control reviews and contract audits to 
ensure appropriate control and use of disaster assistance funding.  
Resources 
     At the end of the 90s, OIGs showed a growing concern over declining resources: 55% of 
OIGs had lost staff and their budgets declined.58 In this regard, some support the idea of 
increasing OIG’s staff and budget.59 On the other hand, Light60 argues that this may lead to 
ineffectiveness. 
In the case of DHS, one of the areas that has critically experienced lack of staffing is the 
procurement area. In fact, DHS Inspector General has reported that the lack of staffing is 
preventing proper procurement planning and it severely limits their ability to monitor contractor 
                                                 
57 Taxpayers Against Fraud, USA Today, July 10, 2007. 
58 Newcomer, Kathryn E.  “The Changing Nature of Accountability: The Role of the Inspector General in Federal 
Agencies.” Public Administration Review. Vol. 58, No. 2. (Mar. – Apr., 1998), pp. 129-136. 
59 Some supporters are McKinney and Johnston, Op. Cit., 1986. 
60 Light, Paul. “Federal Ethics Controls: The Role of Inspectors General” in Frederickson, H. George editor with a 
foreword by John A. Rohr. Ethics and public administration. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.1993.) 
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performance and conduct effective contract oversight (DHS Inspector General Semiannual 
Report to Congress, Oct.2007.)61  
The GAO reported in 2005 that the DHS’s Office of the Chief Procurement Officer had 
only two people to conduct oversight on the eight separate procurement offices, which handled 
nearly $10 billion in procurement activity during the fiscal year 2004. Many procurement offices 
reported that their lack of staffing prevented proper procurement planning and severely limited 
their ability to monitor contractor performance and conduct effective contract administration.62 
In this regard, GAO recommended that DHS provide the Office of the Chief Procurement 
Officer with sufficient resources and enforcement authority to enable effective department-wide 
oversight of acquisition policies and procedures.63 
According to the DHS’ Procurement and Program Management Operations Report, Sept. 
2005, the amount of contract awards per procurement staff person ranges from $3 million up to 
$30 million depending on the DHS procurement organization. DHS purchased almost $9.8 
billion of goods and services in fiscal year 2004 through a variety of procurement methods such 
as contracts, delivery orders, interagency agreements, and purchases cards. In making these 
contracts, DHS processed almost 60,000 procurement actions.64  
In the 2006 report to GAO, DHS noted significant progress in providing staff for the 
component contracting offices.65 Moreover DHS established a goal of aligning procurement 
staffing levels with contract spending at its various components by the last quarter of fiscal year 
2009. Interestingly enough, GAO highlighted the fact that procurement specialists should not 
only be improved in quantity but also in quality - acquisition professionals should be well 
qualified and trained.66    
Training 
As described above, the United States largely practices privatization (which is almost 
always achieved by contracting out) for urban projects, building, and for goods such as 
computers and weapons. Awarding and supervising contracts with private organizations is one of 
bureaucracies’ most critical activities. It requires people with specific skills and knowledge. 
                                                 
61 According to DHS’ Procurement and Program Management Operations Report, Sept. 2005, the amount of 
contract awards per procurement staff person ranges from $3 million up to $30 million. 
62 DHS OIG 2005, Ibid, p.10 
63 Statement of Carlo Mann, Chief Inspector, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, Office of Inspector 
General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Before a Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on Economic 
Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cyber-Security Committee on Homeland Security and the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of 
Representatives, July 20 2006. pp.2-3 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm_CM_072006.pdf 
64 DHS OIG Department of Homeland Security’s Procurement and Program Management Operations. Sept. 2005, 
p.10, available at : http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_05-53_Sep05.pdf 
65 GAO 2006. Homeland Security. Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization. Available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061012t.pdf  
66 GAO 2007. Ongoing Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization. Available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07948t.pdf 
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Recently, the DHS Inspector General proposed emphasizing ethical procurement 
responsibilities and providing a robust support structure for both program and procurement 
management (DHS OIG Semiannual Report 2006). These programs would particularly include 
real examples of procurement fraud in addition to teaching applicable regulations. Expanded 
training and guidance on their ethical responsibilities would definitely benefit senior program 
managers and procurement officials.67 Furthermore, these initiatives will affect OIGs’ operations 
against fraud and other forms of misconduct. 
The contracting out and procurement activities 
Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, federal government contracting for goods and services has 
increased from $219 billion to almost $417 billion for FY 2006. The DHS contract spending was 
$15.7 billion for FY 2006, according to April 12, 2007 data from the Federal Procurement Data 
Service. However, agencies experienced adverse selection problems with their contractors. For 
instance, according to a report of the GAO 68 agencies continue to experience poor acquisition 
outcomes in buying goods and services in part because of challenges in setting contract 
requirements, using the appropriate contract with the right incentives, and ensuring sufficient 
oversight.69  
DHS contracting out operations include a large number of procurement actions. This is 
basically due to the extent and importance of the department. DHS’s mission is to prevent 
terrorist attacks in the U.S., reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize damage 
from terrorism and natural disasters.70 To fulfill this mission, DHS has a vast organizational 
mandate that ranges from protecting the President (U.S. Secret Service), protecting our oceans 
(U.S. Coast Guard), borders (Customs & Border Protection and Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement), airports (Transportation Security Administration), and to helping every town, city, 
county, and state in relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency).71 As a result, DHS has to be on the cutting edge of innovation, technology, and service 
to stay at least one step ahead of threats to America.72 
                                                 
67 Statement of David M. Zavada, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Before the Committee on Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives, July 27, 2006. P. 3 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm-DMZ_072706.pdf 
68 GAO: “Federal Acquisitions and Contracting, systemic Challenges Need Attention”, July 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071098t.pdf 
69 Violations to ethical regulations, insufficient oversight of procurement programs and inadequate management of 
disaster grants are some of the critical problems in DHS. Those issues are discussed in Apaza “The Administration 
of Ethics in DHS: Adherence to Ethical Conduct, Procurement, and Grant Management Ethics.” June 2007. PA 
Times, The American Society for Public Administration (ASPA)’s Newspaper. 
70 DHS website: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm 
71 DHS OIG Department of Homeland Security’s Procurement and Program Management Operations. Sept. 2005, 
p.10, available at :http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_05-53_Sep05.pdf 
72 Testimony of Project on Government Oversight (POGO)'s Scott Amey, General Counsel before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security “Responsibility in Federal Homeland Security Contracting” ,  April 20, 2007, 
available at: 
http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/ct-070420-contracting.html#. It is based on the following information: Federal 
Procurement Data Service - Next Generation, “FY 2003, Section III, Agency Views,” p. 90 and “List of Agencies 
Submitting,” as of April 12, 2007, p. 1.   
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In the accomplishment of its mission DHS has produced more than 60,000 procurement 
actions. However, DHS has left the effective monitoring of oversight mechanisms far behind. 
Even the OIG has not had enough capacity to monitor DHS contracting. For instance, the Project 
of Government Oversight (POGO) argues that DHS IG has not properly investigated very 
expensive complaints on DHS contracting disclosed by whistleblowers. Moreover, POGO claims 
that DHS OIG’s staff has been ignoring whistleblowers with legitimate and critical information 
on serious and expensive fraud cases, such as the $96.1 million fraud case on patrol boats 
acquisition.73  POGO has repeatedly criticized the lack of oversight of a large number of 
government purchases.74 The problem may be rooted in changes to the procurement system 
during the 90s.   
In 1993, the New Public Management (NPM), also known in the U.S. as reinventing 
government, recommended crucial changes to the procurement system and that became the basis 
for the three major legislative changes signed by President Clinton: The Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994, the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, and  the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act of 1996. These laws significantly focused on efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness.75 With these reforms reinventors expected to save $12.3 billion over five 
years.76 However, numerous fraud cases accounted for billions of dollars as detailed above. 
Hence, NPM may have created more opportunities for corruption (especially in contracting.) 
Empowerment might indeed foster corruption when inexperienced and insufficiently trained 
contract managers “all of a sudden” have to bear financial and managerial responsibility for 
public money in an environment of market competition, risk and uncertainty.77 In a situation of 
insecurity people tend to make mistakes, even unintentionally.78 Some scholars called this 
corruption trend “unintended consequences” of the New Public Management reforms.79 
Furthermore, government’s reliance on private contractors, through so-called service contracts, 
has increased dramatically. What it knows frequently comes from self-reporting by its own 
contractors or from contractors hired to oversee other contractors.80  
But several other issues form part of the critical context of DHS OIG. For instance, 
previous reports by DHS Inspector General revealed a variety of harmful and expensive 
violations of ethical norms that need to be addressed.81 According to a report of the Project on 
                                                 
73 The letter is available at http://www.pogo.org/p/government/gl-080131-deepwater.html 
74 POGO:  GAO Report Echoes POGO’s Concerns with the DHS Katrina Purchase Card Program Jul.19, 2006. 
Available at: http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/ca-060702-katrina.html 
75 Rosenbloom, David H. and Suzanne Piotrowski. “Outsourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms”. 
The American Review of Public Administration. Vol. 35, No. 2, June 2005, 103-121. 
76 Gore, Al. The Best Kept Secrets in Government. How the Clinton Administration Is Reinventing the Way 
Washington Works. Fourth Report of the National Performance Review. (New York: Random House, 1996, p.17) 
77 Frederickson, Op. Cit.1999. 
78 Maravic, Patrick von, Christoph Reichard. “New Public Management and Corruption: IPM Dialogue and 
Analysis”. International Public Management Review. Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2003.  
79 Savoie, Donald J. “Fifteen Years of Reform: What have We Learned?” in B. Guy Peters and Donald J. Savoie, 
eds., Taking Stock – Assessing Public Sector Reforms. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press: 1998) pp.394-
414. 
80 DiIulio, John J., Jr., Gerald Garvey, Donald F. Kettl. Improving government performance. An Owner’s Manual. 
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993), p35 
81 The importance of DHS does not only rely on its mission but also in its size. On November 25, 2002, President 
Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296, as amended), officially establishing the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. On January 24, 2003, 
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Government Oversight (POGO), during FY 2005 nearly $5.2 billion of the $10.3 billion in 
contract awards were non-competitive. The government estimated that 58.8 percent of the 
Hurricane Katrina contracts awarded before November 30, 2005 were noncompetitive. The 
justification for allowing no-bid contracts was the urgent need for a rapid emergency response. 
However, other government reports have found that 50.5 percent of the contracts have continued 
to be awarded noncompetitively – despite the fact that an emergency action is no longer required 
and, therefore, no longer justifies no-bid contracts.82The use of no-bid contracts increased from 
23 percent in FY 2004 to 37 percent in FY 2005.  
Competitive bidding requires a public agency willing to purchase goods or services to 
advertise its specifications and invite bids. Then an interested individual or firm submits a sealed 
bid, offering to perform the contract for a specified price. The bids are opened at a public 
meeting, and the contract is awarded to the lowest “responsible” bidder. This process, at least in 
theory, should assure efficiency (i.e. lowest price), but how about accountability? Awarding 
contracts according to lowest cost might cause the choice of a firm that is not the best one in 
their field of operations.83 To insure quality and to guarantee against kickbacks, skimming and 
fraud it is essential to have very tightly drawn contracts and careful, close oversight.84 Objective 
information on fraud disclosed by whistleblowers can also significantly help uncovering fraud.  
Whistleblowing and Hotline Complaints 
For Inspectors General the information disclosed by whistleblowers is crucial for their 
investigations. For instance, the DHS OIG annually receives an average 9,693 complaints from 
internal and external whistleblowers.85 External whistleblowers usually blow the whistle through 
hotlines available in public agencies (e.g. hotline of DHS IG) and mostly the disclosed 
information starts OIGs’s investigations and final prosecution of the corruption case.86 Hence, 
external whistleblowers’ disclosures are significant to the success of misconduct investigations,87 
and so they need to be adequately protected.88 But, internal whistleblowing should also be 
strengthened. Thus, a legislative proposal to provide whistleblower protection for all employees 
                                                                                                                                                             
DHS became operational and on March 1, 2003, 22 agencies and approximately 181,000 employees were transferred 
to the new department. 
82 POGO's Report Federal Contracting: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina 
http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/katrina/co-KatrinaContractingB.html 
83 Anechiarico Op. Cit. 1996 
84 Frederickson, Op. Cit. 1999 
85 This average is estimated according to the number of complaints received reported in the Semiannual Reports to 
Congress from 2003 to 2007. 
86 The number of Complaints received by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) totaled: 7,716 in 2003, 11,724 
in 2004, 16,140 in 2005, 8,826 in 2006, and 3,715 in 2007-1st semester (DHS OIG Semiannual Reports 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006 and 2007). 
87 Glaeser, and Saks, Op. Cit., 2006 ,p. 241, Westman, Daniel.  Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge. 
(Washington, DC, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1991.) 
88 Dworkin, Terry Morehead, and Melissa S. Baucus. “Internal vs. External Whistleblowers: A Comparison of 
Whistleblowers Processes”. Journal of Business Ethics. Vol. 17, No. 12. Sep., 1998. 
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serving in DHS is currently being considered.89 This is strongly supported by the Project on 
Government Oversight (POGO) and the Government Accountability Project (GAP.)90 
 
 
Data analysis corresponding to DHS OIG’s activities 
 
           Table 1. DHS OIG Enacted Budget Authority - FY 2004 - FY2008 
       
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
DHS OIG Total Budget 
Authority Enacted 80,318,000 82,317,000 82,187,000 98,685,000 108,711,000
DHS OIG Employees 
(FTE) 457 502 540 545 551
Fiscal Years
             Source: DHS Budget in Brief  FY 2004-FY200891 
Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 DHS OIG has maintained an increasing number of 
employees, with the highest increase in FY2005 and the least in FY 2007. In FY 2005 DHS OIG 
got 45 more employees than in FY2004. In the same vein, in FY2007 DHS OIG had 5 more 
employees than in FY2006. The budget has also been experiencing a moderate increase during 
FY 2004 - FY 2008 with a high increase in FY2007 and a very slight decrease in FY2006. In 
FY2007 DHS OIG’s budget totaled $16,498,000 more than in FY2006. However, in FY2006 the 
budget obtained was $130,000 less than in FY2005.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
89 DHS Inspector General Semiannual Report October 2006, p.66 OGE ethics training programs  
http://www.usoge.gov/pages/comp_web_trng/cwt_modules/oge450_wbt_06/33f.html 
90 However, POGO highlights a number of cases where DHS’s whistleblowers´s rights are not respected. For 
instance, in October 2006, the Government Accountability Project (GAP) challenged a decision by the Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to fire a Federal Air Marshal for 
revealing an unclassified plan that would have removed air marshals from nonstop long-distance flights, similar to 
those hijacked for the 9/11 terrorist attacks (October 30, 2006 Department of Homeland Security Violates 
Whistleblower Protection Laws. TSA Fired Air Marshal for Exposing Operational Plan that Endangered Public 
Safety http://www.pogo.org/p/government/ga-061001-tsa.html)  
91 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2009.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Budget_BIB-FY2007.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Budget_BIB-FY2006.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/FY_2005_BIB_4.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/FY_2004_BUDGET_IN_BRIEF.pdf 
Note: Fiscal Year goes October 1st  to September 30th  
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          Figure 1: DHS OIG Enacted Budget Authority vs. Recoveries 
   
 
         
        
        
     
   
     
   
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
 
Source: DHS Budget in Brief  FY 2004-FY2008  
DHS OIG Semiannual Report to the Congress: Oct. 1, 2002 – Mar. 31, 2003; Apr. 1 2003 – Sep. 30, 
2003; Oct. 1, 2003 – Mar. 31, 2004; Apr. 1, 2004 – Sep. 30, 2004; Oct. 1, 2004 – Mar. 31, 2005; 
Apr. 1, 2005 – Sep. 30, 2005; Oct. 1, 2005 – Mar. 31, 2006; Apr. 1, 2006 – Sep. 30,  2006, Oct. 1, 
2006 – Mar. 31, 2007, Apr. 1, 2007- Sep. 30, 2007.92 
 
During FY2003 to FY2007, the total amount of recoveries including restitutions, fines, 
and administrative cost savings averaged a yearly recovery of approximately 60% of the budget. 
The highest total recovery was obtained in FY2005 when recoveries totaled $122,206,185 
surpassing their own budget by approximately 49%. The second highest recovery was in FY2007 
when the total DHS OIG recovery was 51,155,750, which was 47% of their budget enacted for 
that Fiscal Year. The least amount of recoveries was in FY2004 with $17,172,516, representing 
21% of the budget for that fiscal year. 
                                                 
92 http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_Spring_2003_SAR.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_Fall_2003_SAR.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_Spring2004SAR187c.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_SARApr_Sep04.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_SAR_Oct04_Mar05.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_SAR_Apr05_Sep05.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/OIG_SAR_Oct05_Mar06.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_SAR_Apr06_Sep06.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_SAR_Oct06_Mar07.pdf 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/semiannlrpts/OIG_SAR_Apr07_Sep07.pdf 
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   Table 2. Statistical Highlights of OIG Activities/ Dollar Impact 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Questioned costs 46,230,246 42,381,398 58,747,978 65,353,765 85,770,552 298,483,939
Recoveries, restitutions, fines, 
administrative cost savings 
22,466,116 17,172,516 122,206,185 34,805,631 51,155,750 247,806,198
Management Reports Issued 67 125 82 62 79 415
Reports Issued (Investigations) 10 408 498 471 1006 2,393
Grant and Contract Audit Reports 
Issued and/or Processed
25 78 231 304 228 866
Investigations initiated 451 1,468 1,902 1,494 1,004 6,319
Investigations closed 588 392 639 507 1052 3,178
Arrests 67 202 200 521 598 1,588
Indictments 76 203 135 583 596 1,593
Convictions 69 119 109 366 393 1,056
Complaints received including 
hotline
5,828 9,411 19,722 30,520 13,290 78,771
Complaints closed 3,435 6,392 12,219 15,183 14,161 51,390
Fiscal Years
Cumulative
 
Source: DHS OIG Semiannual Report to the Congress: Oct. 1, 2002 – Mar. 31, 2003; Apr. 1 2003 – Sep. 30, 
2003; Oct. 1, 2003 – Mar. 31, 2004; Apr. 1, 2004 – Sep. 30, 2004; Oct. 1, 2004 – Mar. 31, 2005; Apr. 1, 2005 
– Sep. 30, 2005; Oct. 1, 2005 – Mar. 31, 2006; Apr. 1, 2006 – Sep. 30,  2006, Oct. 1, 2006 – Mar. 31, 2007, 
Apr. 1, 2007- Sep. 30, 2007 
 
This table summarizes key activities and accomplishments of DHS OIG. During Fiscal 
Years 2003-2007, DHS OIG identified significant potential dollar savings from a range of audits, 
investigations, evaluations, and inspections. Cumulatively, these efforts resulted in: 
$298,483,939 in questioned costs, $247,806,198 from investigative recoveries and receivables, 
1,593 indictments; over 1,056 convictions; and about 51,390 complaints processed. 
 According to notes and explanations detailed in DHS OIG’s Semiannual Reports to 
Congress, a “questioned” cost is a finding in which, at the time of the audit, is not supported by 
adequate documentation or is unreasonable or unallowable. Total recoveries result as final 
outcomes of investigations. Management reports are referred to inspection and performance audit 
activities. Investigation reports are specifically related to investigation activities. Grand and 
Contract Audit Reports address financial audit activities.  
The figure shows an increasing number of investigations reports during FY2003-FY2007. 
The number of reports for investigations in this period is significantly higher than the number of 
management reports, grant and contract audit reports. The highest increase occurred in FY2007 
when there were 1,006 investigation reports, which represents an increase of 214% in relation to 
FY2006. The number of grant and contract audit reports are second in terms of increasing 
number of reports. They have been modestly growing, reaching their highest number in FY2006 
when there were 304 grant and contract audit reports, which represents an increase of 132% in 
comparison to FY2005. Management reports show a slight variance during FY2003 - FY2007. 
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Their highest variance and increase occurred in FY2004 when there were 125 management 
reports which represents and increase of 187% in relation to FY2003.  
Figure 2: Evolution of DHS OIG Reports on Management, Grant and Contract Audit, and 
Investigations 
 
      
 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Source: DHS OIG Semiannual Report to the Congress: Oct. 1, 2002 – Mar. 31, 2003; Apr. 1 
2003 – Sep. 30, 2003; Oct. 1, 2003 – Mar. 31, 2004; Apr. 1, 2004 – Sep. 30, 2004; Oct. 1, 
2004 – Mar. 31, 2005; Apr. 1, 2005 – Sep. 30, 2005; Oct. 1, 2005 – Mar. 31, 2006; Apr. 1, 
2006 – Sep. 30,  2006, Oct. 1, 2006 – Mar. 31, 2007, Apr. 1, 2007- Sep. 30, 2007 
On average, during FY2003-FY2007, the number of investigation reports is 
approximately 6 times more than management reports and almost 3 times more than grant and 
contract audit reports. This confirms the theory that in agencies with more contracting and 
procurement activities, OIG’s investigations are likely to be higher than other OIG activities.    
        Table 3: DHS OIG's Recommendations Accepted   
      
  Fiscal Years 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
% Recommendations 
Accepted 
92% 93% 91% 91%   
Target % 
 
n/a 
 
90% 
 
73% 
 
85% 
 
85% 
      
Source: DHS's Annual Performance Report FY 2007 - 2009 available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cfo_apr_fy2007.pdf    
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Figure 3: DHS OIG's Recommendations Accepted by DHS vs. DHS' Targets 
        
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Recommendations suggested by DHS OIG have been positively received by DHS 
managers. They have concurred with higher percentages of OIG’s recommendations. The 
percentage of recommendations accepted average approximately 93% per fiscal year. This is 
indeed an excellent accomplishment of DHS OIG.  
 
Conclusions 
Bureaucratic oversight mechanisms are to ensure that public officials conduct themselves 
ethically as well as effectively and efficiently. These control mechanisms may be internal or 
external. The former refer more to accounting evaluation and are usually conducted by an audit 
unit of the target agency. The latter refer more to investigations activities and have been formally 
operated by legislatively created offices such as auditors, inspectors, and independent counsels.  
 Inspectors General (IG)’s independence is a key point when evaluating the achievements 
of IGs in the accomplishment of their mission. This critical point was broadly discussed during 
the Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate on 
September 9, 1998, (celebrating twenty years of the Inspector General Act.) They claimed the 
need of strengthening IG’s independence so they can adequately perform their job.  
Overall, the outcomes from the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS OIG) have been moderately increasing during FY 2003 to FY 2007.  
The amount of recoveries averages a yearly recovery of approximately 60% of the budget for 
that period. 
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In average during FY2003-FY2007, DHS OIG’s number of investigation reports is far 
higher than the number of management reports as well as the number of grant and contract audit 
reports. This confirms the theory that agencies with more contracting out and procurement 
activities, OIG’s investigations are likely to be higher than other OIG activities. Moreover, the 
percentage of DHS OIG’s recommendations accepted by DHS’ managers average approximately 
93% per fiscal year during the period FY2004 - FY2008.  
Overall, the data analysis shows that DHS OIG has been efficiently accomplishing its 
mission. The high percentage of its recommendations accepted by DHS managers show that OIG 
is viewed as a resource rather than an adversary. 
